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MEASURING THE DURATION OF JUDICIAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS: A COMMENT
David P. Doane*
Professors Clark and Merryman propose a useful indirect
measure of the duration of litigation whose primary virtue is its ease
of computation from published court data. As the authors note, such
a measure of duration may be useful to persons involved in judicial
administration and to attorneys formulating strategy in litigation, 1 and
the legal community should find informative their illustration of the
concept with Italian court data. Concluding on a pragmatic note,
Professors Clark and Merryman appear to suggest that attorneys,
clients, judges, court administrators, and social scientists must ultimately assess the utility of their concept. 2 In making this assessment,
we ought to consider several aspects of their proposal, including some
underlying practical and .theoretical problems. Several of the appropriate caveats apply to all statistical rese~ch, while others are
directed specifically to their concept of the duration of litigation
@)).s

There is no question that most court statistics published in this
country are inadequate. The picture, however, is not as bleak as
Professors Clark and Merryman seem to suggest. 4 Researchers do
have access to fairly accurate data without archival research in a
growing number of jurisdictions. The federal courts, for example,
have for years published estimates of the duration of litigation,
including median and mean statistics, broken down according to the
type of case, the circuit, and even the district. 6 Also available are
the "federal case weights," 11 compiled since 1964, which estimate the
average number of judge-hours required to dispose of particular

* Associate Professor of Economics, Oakland University. B.A. 1966, University
of Kansas; Ph.D. 1969, Purdue University.-Ed.
1. See Clark & Merryman, Measuring the Duration of Judicial and .Administrative
Proceedings, 15 MICH. L. REV. 89, 89-90 & nn.1 & 2 (1976).
2. See id. at 99.
3. The variable D will be used specifically in reference to the measure of duration
proposed by Professors Clark and Merryman. See id. at 92-95.
4. See id. at 91-92 nn.10-11.
5. These statistics have been available since the late 1960s. See U.S. ADMINIS•
TRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 245i-245n
246-84 (1970). A graphic example of the rapidity of -the changes in statisticai
availability can be obtained by comparing the 1970 and 1973 Annual Reports.
6. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 1969-1970 FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT TIMB
STUDY 31 (1971).
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types of cases. Of course, the federal system has been at the forefront both in the development of statistical reporting systems and
centralized administrative planning, two goals which have so far
eluded most state and municipal court systems. In fact, it is probably fair to say that the federal judicial system is about ten years
ahead of the average state court system in statistical_ sophistication. 7
The federal system's successful application of this statistical information to a variety of tasks, however, has undoubtedly served as a
powerful incentive for state and local courts to push for similar
statistical capabilities.
As Professors Clark and Merryman note, 8 California, Maryland,
New Jersey, New York and a part of Pennsylvania publish mean or
median statistics for the duration of litigation. To this list we may
at least add Illinois, Michigan, and Utah, which according to the
National Center for State Courts (Center), also compile and publish
such statistics. 9 Significantly, these states together include approximately one third of the population of the United States. Further,
at least twenty-five to thirty states regularly submit annual reports
to the Center that include statistics comparable to those compiled by
Professors Clark and Merryman for Italian courts. 10 An indirect
measure of the duration of litigation may be derived from this data.
It is considerably more difficult to determine the statistical sophistication of the local court systems. However, the District of Columbia,
New York City, Los Angeles, and other California cities publish
mean and median statistics that, if not superior, are at least comparable in sophistication to those statistics of the more advanced states.
Standardized statistical reporting must be a first priority for state
and local judicial systems since it is a sine qua non for modernization.
In addition, since the qost effectiveness of such reporting systems has
been widely demonstrated, it is reasonable to predict -that within a
few years all but the smallest courts will be able to afford to publish
high-quality statistics. The national Center for State Courts and the
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) are now
sponsoring projects to speed the modernization of information systems and to improve comparability of statistics among jurisdictions:
7. See, e.g., U.S. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. CoURTS, supra note 1;
U.S. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, MANAGEMENT STATISTICS FOR
UNITED STATES CoURTS (1973).
8. See Clark & Merryman, supra note 1, at 92 n.10.
9. See Court Case Weights Using the Delphi Method: Report on an Experiment in the Michigan Circuit Courts, paper presented by D. Doane at Joint National
Meeting, Operations Research Society of America and The Institute of Management
Sciences, Nov. 3, 1976, Miami Beach, Fla. [hereinafter Doane Paper] on file at
Michigan Law Review.
10. See id.
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Of greater potential for the courts themselves, though its fruition is
likely ten years away, is LEAA's Standard Judicial Information System Project. With [pilot projects] now operating in eleven states,
[this project] is a truly major effort to develop the basic information
systems needed for court management at the state level. Changing
technology . . . makes possible the development of similar decentralized but compatible systems even in small courts.11

Thus, the inadequacy of most state and local court statistics is a
diminishing, if still troublesome, problem.
If, however, published data in a particular jurisdiction do not
include direct measures of duration of litigation, it is necessary to
use an indirect measure. Before adopting any particular estimate
of the duration of litigation, such as the equation for index D offered
by Professors Clark and Merryman, it is helpful to recognize the
limits of its statistical validity and its proper applications. For
instance, the index D is a proxy variable whose theoretical properties
are uncertain. It should not be regarded as a substitute for a mean
or median statistic, since it does not closely resemble either one. It
is correct, as Professor Clark and Merryman claim,12 that D will probably more closely approximate the mean than the median. Even a
high correlation between D and the median duration, however, does
not establish that D is a "good" alternative, except in the limited
sense that both measures tend to vary in the same direction. Moreover, a high degree of correlation (R2
0.54) 13 does not necessarily
have much practical significance to an individual litigant. The attempt to relate D to the mean or median seems to be a digression
from the main argument. It is sufficient to say that D is simply one
possible "measure of central tendency,"14 and then to identify its
more important features, including its limitations.
It is first important to recognize that D is really just the ratio of
ending inventory to withdrawn and adjudicated cases. It is not an
annual input-output ratio as Professors Clark and Merryman claim,
but rather a stock-flow ratio. Roughly speaking, D is the inverse of
what accountants call the "inventory turnover ratio," a widely used
management tool. 15 This fact may help some readers recognize the
essential simplicity and possible uses of D statistics.
Second, D is unable to offer a good measure of a court's capacity
to deliver judgments, assumed to be equivalent to the number of trials.

=

11. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT 9 (1975).
12. See Clark & Merryman, supra note 1, at 95 n.18.
13. Id.
14. A measure of central tendency is a s~tistic that reduces a large body of data
to a single term, such as a mean, median, or mode.
15. See G. WELSCH, C. ZLATKOVITCH & J. WHITE, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING
1046 (1972).
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This criticism focuses on the use of D as a measure of the efficiency of
a court. Illustratively, suppose that during a given year 500 final
judgments have been rendered (J) and 500 cases have been withdrawn (W), and that at the end of the year 1,000 cases are pending.
Since
Pt+ 1
D=---

J+W
we find that by plugging in our illustrative statistics,
1,000
D =----- 1
500+500
which Professors Clark and Merryman interpret to mean that, on the
average, it will take one year to decide a newly filed case in the subsequent year. However, given our court's illustrative work rate and
assuming cases are decided in order of filing, if all cases were actually brought to trial it would, in fact, take two years for the court
to work its way down the queue to a newly filed case. The capacity
of our court to adjudicate cases, therefore, is better reflected by
DonVito's index16
P
1,000
D=-=--=2
J
500

Third, -the D index probably would not be helpful in assigning
cases and staffing courts and administrative tribunals. The primary
virtue of the D statistic is its ease of computation. However, the
proper allocation of judicial resources requires a more specialized
statistical tool, and the most promising developments in this area
involve refinements of the case-weight statistics already fashioned
for the federal courts. 17 Case weights are designed to reflect the
resource demands imposed by different types of cases. An index
of duration is but one measure of the- demands. The issues now
being discussed in connection with case-weight estimation have revealed many difficulties that prohibit the cavalier use of an indirect
measure of duration to allocate judicial resources. 18
16. See DonVito, An Experiment in the Use of Court Statistics, 56 JUD. 56
(1972). The individual. litigant, however, is not interested solely in the court's
capacity to render judgments. The number of cases withdrawn has an important
Pt
effect on his behavior. Thus, for his purposes the formula - - may be superior
J+W
Pt
to DonVito's - .
J

11. See text at note 6 supra.
18. See Doane Paper, supra note 9.
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Finally, a potential problem exists in determining what judicial
action ought to be considered a separate "case" for purposes of
measurement. This is important since the definition of a case, which
underlies the measurement of all the variables in the equation for
D, appears to vary among jurisdictions. For example, some courts
may count litigation involving multiple defendants as several cases,
equating the number of cases with the number of codefendants in
the complaint. This practice is generally at odds with the standard
accounting practice, but it illustrates the potential for disparity.
Similarly, some courts count as separate cases court actions that
follow up previously tried cases, such as those to enforce judgments
or determine probation violations, and those involving matters on
remand from appellate courts, while other court systems do not. 10
The importance of this can be understood by considering equation
(5) proposed by Professors Clark and Merryman. 20 Assuming this
ratio is less than one, if a jurisdiction adopts a liberal definition of
what action is a "case," its D index would be larger than if the same
jurisdiction more conservatively counted cases. A similar result
would follow if two different jurisdictions adopted different accounting definitions. Thus, D has only limited validity for comparisons
among jurisdictions until statistical reporting is standardized.
One general word of warning must be voiced regarding the
general limitations of statistical methods. Professors Clark and
Merryman imply that in order to predict we must reduce data to a
single, summary term, such as the mean, median, or modal duration. 21 It is true that one of the statistician's duties is to collapse
unwieldy arrays of observed data into a single statistic to comprehend
more easily properties of the phenomenon under observation. There
are, however, two reasons why information reduction alone does not
permit us to predict accurately an individual event.
The first reason is that the next case to be filed must be assumed
to be as variable as the original array of observations. There can
be no appeal to the law of large numbers when dealing with a single
case. Almost by definition, statistical averages should only be used
for broad scale planning since the power of statistics lies more in
identifying general characteristics than in predicting specific events.
The second reason is best considered by reference to an illustration. Let us consider, for example, two courts, A and B, whose distributions of case processing times for the same types of cases vary
19. See id.
20. See Clark & Merryman, supra note 1, at 94.
21. Id. at 92.
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as shown in Figure 1 and are skewed to the right as Professors
Clark and Merryman suggest.22
FIGURE 1

...

Mean for
B
Key: lower axis measures duration of litigation and shaded area
represents extent of overlap

The mean duration for court B exceeds that for court A, but since
the variations in time for the two courts are so large,· the distributions
overlap to a significant degree. In other words, the observed difference in means, although statistically significant, may have little
practical significance for litigants making short-run, individual decisions. Practitioners will perhaps find it easy to accept the a priori
argument that the variation in time is indeed large.
As a final consideration, it is clear that the average duration of
litigation is partly a result of conscious strategic actions by attorneys
and other decision-makers. It is too simplistic to assume that time
impinges only as an exogenous constraint in the model of litigant
decision-making. Much work remains if we are to construct new
theoretical formulations of behavior that are both logically and
empirically appropriate for application. ·Despite the pragmatic
nature of their article, Professors Clark and Merryman do their part
to identify relevant underlying issues. This is a characteristic of
good empirical research: It brings trouble spots into sharp focus and
swells the queue of unanswered theoretical questions. Professors
Clark and Merryman have taken an important step in formulating
a basic vocabulary of working concepts and indicators to be used by
researchers. The next steps belong to the model builders. 23
22. Id. at 95 n.18.
23. The best behavioral modeling may be found in the utility-maximization approach, see Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. LAw & EcoN. 61
(1971), and the systems-descriptive Markov models. See Blumstein, Management
Science to Aid the Manager, 15 SLOAN MANAGEMENT REVIEW 35 {Fall, 1973).

